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1 Introduction
Since Eaton and Grossman (1986), one of the major criticisms of the strategic trade literature has been its
non-robustness to the mode of market competition. If trade policy is sensitive to the choice of strategic
variable by firms and governments are uncertain about the mode of competition then strategic trade policy
can be more harmful than beneficial. In this paper, we analyze export subsidies when firms invest in
cost-reducing R&D before the market competition stage. Governments choose export subsidies first. After
observing governments’ choice, firms invest in R&D and then compete in a third market (in prices or
quantities). We find that for sufficiently cost effective R&D1 governments subsidize exports independently
of the mode of competition. This suggests that export subsidies are more robust to the type of the market
competition than implied by the recent literature.
Several authors have studied the robustness of strategic trade policy using two kinds of models. In the
first kind, in a two-stage game, governments first commit to output subsidies and then firms compete in the
market. Using this approach Brander and Spencer (1985) show that the optimal trade policy is an export
subsidy under Cournot competition. Eaton and Grossman (1986), however, show that the optimal strategic
trade policy reverses to an export tax if firms compete in prices.2 This policy reversal highlights the lack of
robustness of strategic trade policy when governments are uncertain about the mode of competition.
In the second kind of models, actions are chosen in a three-stage game: governments first commit to a
policy, firms then invest in R&D and later compete in the market. In such models, investing in a strate-
gic variable before the market competition stage captures entry barriers, a feature that is fundamental to
oligopolistic market structures (see Sutton, 1991). A further appeal of these models is that they capture firm
commitment to a strategic variable before the competition stage (Grossman, 1988). If firms can make sunk
investments before the market competition stage then governments have two instruments at their disposal:
output and R&D subsidies. If governments use only R&D policy Bagwell and Staiger (1994) show that gov-
ernments subsidize R&D under both Cournot and Bertrand Competition.3 Based on this, Brander (1995)
suggests that R&D subsidies seem more robust than output subsidies. Neary and Leahy (2000), however,
dispute Brander’s claim.4 They show that when governments use two instruments (an output and a R&D
subsidy at the same time) then both instruments are not robust to the nature of market competition.5
This paper adds another argument against Brander’s claim that R&D subsidies are more robust than
output subsidies. If governments only subsidize exports and firms invest in R&D (before competing in the
1We refer to the cost-effectiveness of R&D as the effect of R&D on marginal costs relative to the cost of investing in R&D.
2The reversal in the optimal export policy is explained by the fact that outputs are strategic substitutes and prices are
strategic complements. See Brander (1995) for a discussion on this.
3Spencer and Brander (1983) had shown the optimality of R&D subsidies under Cournot competition. Bagwell and Staiger
(1994) develop a model where the effect of R&D investment is stochastic. In the case where R&D reduces the mean but does
not affect the variance of costs (the closest case to deterministic R&D), they find that R&D should be subsidized under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Maggi (1996) finds a similar result in a model where firms invest in capacities (instead of
R&D) before the competition stage. The optimal policy in his model is to subsidize capacities.
4See Neary and Leahy (2000), page 505.
5Neary and Leahy (2000) show that under Cournot competition governments subsidize exports and tax R&D, a result found
in Spencer and Brander (1983). However, under Bertrand competition, governments will tax exports and subsidize R&D.
The intuition is that governments use export policy to shift profits from foreign firms (as in models without R&D) and use
R&D policy to correct the distortion on R&D generated by the strategic behavior of firms. Therefore, if governments use two
instruments, R&D is no longer robust to changes in the mode of competition.
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market), we show that the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition, provided R&D is sufficiently cost-effective.6 This means that output policy is more robust than
previously considered by the literature. This is true especially in industries where the marginal cost of R&D
is not too high relative to its effect on process innovation.
The paper closest to ours are Spencer and Brander (1983) and Neary and Leahy (2000). Spencer and
Brander (1983) show that governments impose an output subsidy under Cournot competition when firms
can invest in R&D before competing in the market. They analyze two cases that are different to ours. First,
they show the optimality of output subsidies if they are set by governments after firms decide their R&D
investment. Second, they show that output subsidies are optimal if they are set jointly with R&D subsidies
before R&D is chosen by firms. In the first part of our paper, we extend their results to the case when
output subsidies are chosen before firms invest in R&D.
In a numerical simulation, Neary and Leahy (2000) show that if governments only use output subsidies
then the Eaton and Grossman trade policy reversal from Cournot to Bertrand competition is still observed
when firms invest in R&D before the market competition stage. In this paper, we show that their result
holds only when R&D is ineffective at reducing marginal costs. Our result becomes clear once one realizes
that the effect of R&D on profits depends on the level of output. Due to output expansion, an export subsidy
increases the ability of domestic R&D to shift profits from the foreign firm. Output expansion, due to the
output subsidy, occurs under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Therefore, only looking at R&D,
governments have the incentive to subsidize exports both under price and quantity competition.
The sign of the optimal policy depends upon the net effect of the export subsidy on the R&D and the
market competition stage. In a model without R&D, the sign of the strategic trade policy depends on the
strategic complementarity or substitutability of the variables chosen by firms in the market competition
stage. Under R&D and Cournot competition, a unilateral export subsidy increases welfare both in the R&D
and in the market competition stage. This means that governments want to subsidize exports (Spencer and
Brander, 1983). Under Bertrand competition, however, the two effects have the opposite sign. If R&D is
sufficiently cost effective then R&D will be relatively elastic with respect to an export subsidy. This high
elasticity of R&D will make the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage stronger than the effect on the
price competition stage. In this case, governments subsidize output under Bertrand competition. Conversely,
if R&D is not sufficiently cost-effective then the effect of an output subsidy on the price competition stage
dominates the effect on the R&D stage and the optimal policy under Bertrand competition is an output tax.
We use the standard third country model of strategic trade as in Spencer and Brander (1983). Two
firms, one located in each country, produce a differentiated good which is exported to a third country. There
is no domestic consumption and welfare is measured as producer surplus (profits) net of subsidy costs.7
In a three stage game, the domestic government first sets an output subsidy s1. This is followed by both
firms simultaneously deciding their investment in cost-reducing R&D (∆i and ∆j). In the third stage, firms
6Spencer and Brander (1983) showed that governments impose an output subsidy under Cournot competition when firms
can invest in R&D before competing in the market. However, they focus on two cases that are different to ours. They show the
optimality of output subsidies if they are set by governments after firms decide their R&D investment. They also show that
output subsidies are optimal if they are set jointly with R&D subsidies and before R&D is chosen by firms.
7Public funds may have an opportunity cost bigger than one (as in Neary [1994]). We abstract from this issue in this analysis.
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compete in the product market simultaneously choosing quantities, or prices. At each stage, all players have
complete information about the moves of the preceding stage. We also assume that governments commit to
an export subsidy while firms commit to their investment in R&D.
We proceed as follows: in section 2 we analyze the benchmark free trade case under Cournot competition
and then introduce the choice of an output subsidy by a domestic government. In section 3 we perform the
same analysis under Bertrand competition. Section 4 presents a numerical simulation that highlights the
effect of the convexity of the cost of R&D over the optimal trade policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Cournot Competition
2.1 Final Stage: Quantity Competition
Firms first choose R&D investment. Output is chosen in the second stage of the game. R&D investment
generates a process innovation of size ∆i (by firm i), imposing a monetary cost of φ(∆i) upon the firm. The
monetary cost is increasing and convex in the extent of process innovation and reduces total and marginal
costs of production. Denoting firms by superscripts and derivatives by subscripts these assumptions translate
into:
Ci∆ =
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Ci∆∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (∆i)
2 ≥ 0, C
i
x∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
≤ 0 (1)
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0 (2)
The choice of R&D investment is irreversible and simultaneous for both firms. We assume that goods are
imperfect substitutes and that the own-price effect dominates the cross-price effect:8
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
<
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
< 0 (3)
The following assumptions concern the behavior of revenues Ri(xi, xj) = xipi(xi, xj):
Rij(x
i, xj) = xi
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (4)
Riii(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xi)
2 + 2
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
< 0 (5)
Rijj(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xj)
2 ≥ 0 (6)
Riij(x
i, xj) = xi
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi∂xj
+
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (7)
Assumption (4) states that goods i and j are imperfect substitutes, (5) states that the revenue is concave
in own quantity, and is satisfied by demand functions that are not too convex. Assumption (6) states that
revenue decreases (at a decreasing rate) with an increase in the other firm’s output. This is true in particular
for linear demands. Lastly, (7) states that an increase in sales of one good decreases marginal revenue of the
other (again satisfied in the case of a linear demand).
8Strictly speaking, the condition for the own price effect to dominate the cross price effect is
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xj
)2
<
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xi
)2
.
In this paper we restrict our attention to the case of imperfect substitutes, that is
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xj
< 0.
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Firm i chooses output, xi, to maximize profits, Π
i(xi, xj ,∆i) = Ri(xi, xj) − Ci(xi,∆i) − φ(∆i) =
xipi(xi, xj)− Ci(xi,∆i)− φ(∆i), where Ri(xi, xj) is firm i’s revenue:
max
xi
Πi(xi, xj ,∆i) = Ri(xi, xj)− Ci(xi,∆i)− φ(∆i)
The first order conditions (FOC) to this maximization problem determine the reaction function xi(xj) of
firm i to changes in firm j′s output. These FOCs satisfy
Πii = R
i
i(x
i, xj)− Cix(x
i,∆i) = 0 (8)
with the second order condition
Πiii = R
i
ii(x
i, xj)− Cixx(x
i,∆i) < 0 (9)
= xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xi)
2 + 2
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
−
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
(∂xi)
2 ≤ 0
We assume that the second order condition is always satisfied. For later use we need to assume that the
own effect of output on marginal profit is stronger (greater in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is,
Πiii < Π
i
ij . This then implies that,
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
1
12Π
2
12 > 0 (10)
The solution to the two equations in (8) gives us outputs as a function of R&D levels (chosen in the
previous stage):
x1 = q1(∆1,∆2) (11)
x2 = q2(∆1,∆2) (12)
The slope of firm i’s reaction function is computed by totally differentiating the first order condition (8)
with respect to x1 and x2 (keeping ∆1 and ∆2 constant):
(
Riii(x
i, xj)− Cixx(x
i,∆i)
)
dxi +Riij(x
i, xj)dxj = 0 (13)
This then gives us the slope of firm i′s reaction function, which is negative (i.e. strategic substitutes) from
assumptions (7) and (9):
dxi
dxj
= −
Riij(x
i, xj)(
Riii(x
i, xj)− Cixx(x
i,∆i)
) = − Riij(xi, xj)
Πiii(x
i, xj ,∆i)
< 0 (14)
2.1.1 Effect of R&D Investment on output
The effect of R&D investment on output can be seen by totally differentiating the system of two first order
conditions (given by equation 8):
(
R111(x
1, x2)− C1xx(x
1,∆1)
)
dx1 +R112(x
1, x2)dx2 − C1x∆(x
1,∆1)d∆1 = 0 (15)
R212(x
1, x2)dx1 +
(
R222(x
1, x2)− C2xx(x
2,∆2)
)
dx2 − C2x∆(x
2,∆2)d∆2 = 0 (16)
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We thus have the system,
(
Π111(x
1, x2,∆1) R112(x
1, x2)
R212(x
1, x2) Π222(x
1, x2,∆2)
)(
dx1
dx2
)
=
(
C1x∆(x
1,∆1)d∆1
C2x∆(x
2,∆2)d∆2
)
(17)
Using Cramer’s rule we can write
dxi =
Πjjj(x
i, xj ,∆j)Cix∆(x
i,∆i)d∆i −Riij(x
i, xj)Cjx∆(x
j ,∆j)d∆j
Πiii(x
i, xj ,∆i)Πjjj(x
i, xj ,∆j)−Rjij(x
i, xj)Riij(x
i, xj)
(18)
From this we can obtain expressions that give us the effect on output of domestic ( dx
i
d∆i ) and foreign R&D
( dx
i
d∆j ):
qii(∆
i,∆j) =
dxi
d∆i
=
ΠjjjC
i
x∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
ΠjjjC
i
x∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
> 0 (19)
qij(∆
i,∆j) =
dxi
d∆j
=
−RiijC
j
x∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
−ΠiijC
j
x∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
< 0 (20)
where the inequalities come from (1), (7) and (9). The intuition is straightforward: an increase in R&D
expenditure reduces the marginal cost of production and thus shifts out the reaction curve of firm i. Given
that reaction functions are downward sloping (14), this implies that firm i produces more output while, firm
j produces less.
For later use we need to compute qjij and q
j
ii. Differentiating, (20) we obtain
q
j
ij =
R
j
ijC
i
x∆C
j
xx∆Π
i
ii(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
)2 (21)
q
j
ii =
(
−R
j
ijC
i
x∆∆
)(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
)
+RjijC
i
x∆C
i
xx∆Π
j
jj(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
)2 (22)
Notice that qjij is equal to zero for constant marginal costs with respect to output and q
j
ii is zero for marginal
costs that are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D.
2.2 R&D investment
In the R&D stage the profit function of firm i can be written as πi(∆i,∆j) = Πi(qi(∆i,∆j), q
j(∆i,∆j),∆
i) =
Ri(qi, qj)− Ci(qi,∆i)− φi(∆i). Thus, firm i′s FOC in the simultaneous choice of R&D is9,
πii(∆
i,∆j) =
∂πi
∂∆i
=
∂Πi
∂∆i
+
∂Πi
∂xj
∂qj
∂∆i
= 0 (23)
where ∂Π
i
∂∆i = −C
i
∆(x
i,∆i)− φii(∆
i), ∂Π
i
∂xj
= xi
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xj
< 0, and
∂qj
∂∆i
=
−ΠjijC
i
x∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
< 0. (24)
9Using the envelope theorem ∂Π
i
∂xi
= 0.
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Note that this is just a reflection of the effect mentioned before: an increase in R&D by firm i reduces
its marginal cost and increases the quantity produced. Given that quantities are strategic substitutes, this
results in a reduction in the quantity produced by the other firm (j).
The strategic effect ∂Π
i
∂xj
∂qj
∂∆i is positive. As a result, firms have an incentive to overinvest in R&D. This
decreases rival output and increases own profits. This can be easily seen from (23) where firms choose R&D
to set ∂Π
i
∂∆i < 0.
Noting that Rii(x
i, xj) − Cix(x
i,∆i) = Πii = 0, the first order condition for a Nash equilibrium in the
choice of R&D levels can be rewritten as,
πii(∆
i,∆j) = Rij(x
i, xj)qji (∆
i,∆j)− Ci∆(x
i,∆i)− φii(∆
i) = 0 (25)
with the second order condition,
πiii(∆
i,∆j) = Rijq
j
ii + q
j
i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
− Cix∆q
i
i − C
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0. (26)
Where,
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i = R
i
ij(x
i, xj)qii+R
i
jj(x
i, xj)qji < 0 (by (6), (7), (19) and (20)) and q
j
i
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i −C
i
x∆q
i
i > 0.
Even if we assume that marginal costs are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D,
(i.e. qjii = 0) we still need to ensure that C
i
∆∆+φ
i
ii is big enough for (26) to hold. This implies that as R&D
increases its cost-effectiveness has to decline fast enough.
We now assume a condition similar to (10). It refers to the effect of R&D on profits. Again, assuming
that own effect of R&D on marginal profits is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect (i.e.
πiii < π
i
ij) we get
π111π
2
22 − π
1
12π
2
12 > 0. (27)
Where, πiij = R
i
jq
j
ij + q
j
i
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆j − C
i
x∆q
i
j . In this case
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆j = R
i
ij(x
i, xj)qij +R
i
jj(x
i, xj)qjj > 0 (from
(6), (7), (19) and (20)). This, together with (4), (19), (20), (1), and the assumption that marginal costs are
constant with respect to output (so that qjij = 0), gives us
πiij = q
j
i
(
Riij(x
i, xj)qij +R
i
jj(x
i, xj)qjj
)
− Cix∆q
i
j < 0. (28)
In order to compute the slope of firm i’s reaction function, we differentiate the first order condition (25):
d∆i
d∆j
= −
πiij
πiii
< 0 (29)
where the inequality comes from (26) and (28). Thus, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes.
To understand (28), notice that firm i sets its R&D ∆i to satisfy (25). An infinitesimal increase in ∆i
increases profits for firm i since the total cost of production is reduced. Further, the quantity produced
by firm j in the last stage also declines which, in turn, increases the revenues of firm i.10 This increase in
revenues has to be compared with the cost of increasing R&D φii(∆
i).
10Because of the envelope theorem, the effect of an infinitesimal change on firm i’s R&D on profits through its effect on the
quantity produced by firm i can be ignored
Effectiveness of R&D and Strategic Trade Policy - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - December 17, 2002 7
Consider now an increase in R&D by firm j (∆j). An increase in R&D by firm j increases its own quantity
and reduces the quantity of firm i. The most important effect is the reduction in xi (for linear demands the
effect on xj vanishes), since a lower output implies that own R&D (∆i) is less effective at increasing profits.
Since the marginal cost of R&D for firm 1 does not change, this implies that the optimal level of R&D for
firm 1 has to be lower after an increase in ∆j . Hence
d∆i
d∆j < 0.
2.3 Output subsidies
Suppose that the government 1 subsidizes exports giving a per-unit output subsidy, s1, to its domestic firm.
The profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 can then be written as,
Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1) = R1(x1, x2)− C1(x1,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1x1 = Π1(x1, x2,∆1) + s1x1 (30)
Π¯2(x1, x2,∆2) = Π2(x1, x2,∆2) = R2(x1, x2)− C2(x2,∆2)− φ(∆2) (31)
The net domestic benefit of country 1 is simply the profit of the domestic firm minus the cost of the subsidy,
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1)− s1x1 (32)
= R1(x1, x2)− C1(x1,∆1)− φ(∆1)
= Π1(x1, x2,∆1)
In the first stage, the problem is similar to the one under free trade. Choosing output, xi, firms maximize
profits, Π¯i(x1, x2,∆i, s1). The first order condition for the two firms gives us the following expression,
Π¯11 = R
1
1(x
1, x2)− C1x(x
1,∆1) + s1 = 0 (33)
Π¯22 = R
2
2(x
1, x2)− C2x(x
2,∆2) = 0 (34)
with the same second order condition (9).11 The solution of the two equations in (33) gives us equilibrium
outputs (as a function of R&D levels chosen in the second stage and the output subsidy chosen by government
1 in the first stage):
xi = q¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) (35)
Total differentiation of the first order conditions (33) and (34) (keeping ∆i, ∆j and s1 constant) gives us
the slope of firm i’s reaction function, which is the same as (14). To see the effect of R&D investment and
subsidies over output, we can totally differentiate the two first order conditions (33) and (34):
(
R111(x
1, x2)− C1xx(x
1,∆1)
)
dx1 +R112(x
1, x2)dx2 − C1x∆(x
1,∆1)d∆1 + ds1 = 0 (36a)
R212(x
1, x2)dx1 +
(
R222(x
1, x2)− C2xx(x
2,∆2)
)
dx2 − C2x∆(x
2,∆2)d∆2 = 0. (36b)
11Note that Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as under free trade.
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The effect of R&D on output (keeping the output subsidy constant) is the same as under free trade12
[equations (19) and (20)]. The effect of the subsidy (s1) on output is also determined by the effect the
output subsidy has on R&D of both firms. Keeping R&D levels ∆1 and ∆2 fixed, the partial effects are,
q¯1s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π222
Π111Π
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
> 0 (37)
q¯2s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
R212
Π111Π
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
=
Π212
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
< 0 (38)
The partial effects state that own output is increasing in own (subsidy) and decreasing in the other
subsidy. However, R&D levels are influenced by the choice of output subsidies. Therefore, the total effect of
a change in s1 should take this into account. (Expressions for q¯1
s1
and q¯2
s1
above would be relevant if output
subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.) Using equation (14) we have:
q¯2s1 = q¯
1
s1
dx2
dx1
(39)
Moreover, from (19), (20) we have that,
q¯1s1 = −
q¯1∆1
C1x∆
(40)
q¯2s1 = −
q¯2∆1
C1x∆
(41)
In order to study the effect of imposing an output subsidy before R&D takes place, we now turn to the
R&D stage.
2.3.1 R&D Investment with output subsidies
In the second stage, we can rewrite the profit of a firm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) = Π¯i(q¯i(∆i,∆j , s
1), q¯j(∆i,∆j , s
1),∆i, s1) = Ri(q¯i, q¯j) − Ci(q¯i,∆i) − φi(∆i) + s1q¯i. As be-
fore, we can decompose the effect of a change in R&D (for given output subsidies) into a direct and a
strategic effect. The strategic effect ∂Π
i
∂xj
∂q¯j
∂∆i is still positive. Therefore, for a given output subsidy, firms
overinvest in R&D.
The first order condition for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D is given by the same first order
condition as in the case of free trade:
π¯1∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1) = R12(x
1, x2)q¯2∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1)− C1∆(x
1,∆1)− φ11(∆
1) = 0 (42)
π¯2∆2(∆
2,∆1, s1) = R21(x
2, x1)q¯1∆2(∆
2,∆1, s1)− C2∆(x
2,∆2)− φ21(∆
2) = 0 (43)
With the second order condition, π¯i∆i∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) < 0. In order to see the effect of output subsidies over
R&D investment, we totally differentiate the two first order conditions. The following proposition states the
effect of an output subsidy on the equilibrium R&D of both firms.
12Therefore, q¯i
∆i
(∆i,∆j , si, sj) = qii(∆
i,∆j) and q¯j
∆i
(∆i,∆j , si, sj) = qji (∆
i,∆j)
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Figure 1: Cournot competition: Effect of an output subsidy s imposed by government 1.
Proposition 1 An output subsidy by the domestic government increases the equilibrium level of R&D chosen
by the domestic firm and reduces the R&D level chosen by the foreign firm. That is,
d∆1
ds1
> 0 (44)
d∆2
ds1
< 0. (45)
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the subsidy s1 shifts the reaction function of both firms in R&D
space. The reaction function of firm 1 shifts outwards while the reaction function of firm 2 shifts inwards.
This is illustrated in the left half of figure 1. An output subsidy s1 moves the equilibrium in the R&D
space from point C (free trade) to point S. This implies that for a small increment in its output subsidy,
firm 1 will be inside its isoprofit contour (π1) passing through the free trade equilibrium point C. This
analysis, however, does not take into account the effect of output subsidies in output space (i.e. in the third
stage). The effect in the output competition stage is illustrated on the right side of figure 1. Notice that an
output subsidy s1, imposed by government 1, increases domestic R&D and lowers foreign R&D (as seen in
the left half of figure 1). This reduces domestic marginal costs beyond the direct effect of the subsidy and
increases foreign marginal costs. In output space, this means that the domestic output reaction function
shifts out and the foreign reaction function shifts in. The resulting equilibrium is at point S, which is inside
the isoprofit contour (π1) that passes through the free trade equilibrium at point C. Therefore, an output
subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country both in the R&D and the output stage.
To obtain the optimal output subsidy these two effects need to be included. The net benefit of government
1 is B¯1(s1) = π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1)− s1x1. Differentiating B¯1(s1) with respect to s1 we obtain,
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1
− s1
dq¯1
ds1
. (46)
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Recall that, π¯1s1 = R
1
2(x
1, x2)q¯2s1(∆
1,∆2, s1) + x1 and π¯1∆1 = 0 from the R&D stage. Further,
dq¯1
ds1
= q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1s1 > 0. (47)
This last inequality simply states that the total effect of an output subsidy over equilibrium output is positive,
i.e. an output subsidy makes a firm in that country more competitive in the output stage (q¯1s1 > 0). Further,
an output subsidy reduces foreign R&D while increasing domestic R&D in the second stage. This in turn
benefits domestic production, i.e. q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1 + q¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1 > 0. Given this
∂B¯1
∂s1
simplifies to
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 − s
1 dq¯
1
ds1
(48)
= R12q¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 − s
1 dq¯
1
ds1
= R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2s1
)
− s1
dq¯1
ds1
.
The first term reflects the effect of the output subsidy over domestic benefit in the second (R&D) stage.13
The output subsidy reduces foreign R&D (∆2) resulting in an increase in domestic profits. As a result, the
effect of a subsidy s1 on benefits in the second stage is positive. The second term captures what happens
in the third (output) stage: an increase in the subsidy s1 reduces the quantity produced by the foreign firm
resulting in an increase in domestic revenues (and profits). The third term reflects the increased subsidy
expenditure brought about by an increased production for the domestic firm s1 dq¯
1
ds1 . The sign of the expression
∂B¯1
∂s1
is determined by the net of the three effects pointed out above. Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1
equal to zero, an infinitesimal increase in the output subsidy increases domestic benefit for the subsidizing
country as both the output effect
(
q¯2s1
)
and the R&D effect
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
move in the same direction.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 > 0 (49)
To obtain the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy we set ∂B¯
1
∂s1
= 0:
Proposition 2 When firms compete a` la Cournot, the optimal output subsidy s1∗ is positive:
s1∗ =
π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1
dq¯1
ds1
=
R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2s1
)
q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1
s1
> 0 (50)
Proof. Immediate from (48)
This proposition extends the results in Spencer and Brander (1983). They analyze the case when an
output subsidy is set after firms invest in R&D and before they choose output. They find that the optimal
output subsidy is positive. They also analyze the case of subsidies to R&D and output before the R&D
stage, finding that output subsidies are also positive. Here we have shown that output subsidies are also
positive under Cournot competition if subsidies are set before R&D investment.
Note that the separation into two effects related to each of the two stages in which firms play will be
useful to characterize the solution in the case of Bertrand competition.
13Since firm 1 is choosing R&D, ∆1, to maximize profits then an infinitesimal output subsidy s1will not affect benefits.
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3 Bertrand Competition
3.1 Final Stage: Price Competition
Firms simultaneously choose R&D in the first stage and prices in the second. We assume that goods are
imperfect substitutes and that the own-price effect dominates the cross-price effect,
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 <
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
(51)∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pi
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pj
∣∣∣∣ . (52)
Using previous notation, revenues and costs can be written as, Rˆi(pi, pj) = xi(pi, pj)·pi = Ri(xi(pi, pj), xj(pi, pj))
and Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i) = Ci(xi(pi, pj),∆i), respectively. Revenues are assumed to satisfy the following properties:
Rˆij(p
i, pj) = pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
> 0 (53)
Rˆiii(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)
2 + 2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 (54)
Rˆijj(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pj)2
≥ 0 (55)
Rˆiij(p
i, pj) = pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
> 0 (56)
Assumption (53) states that goods i and j are (imperfect) substitutes. (54) states that revenue is concave in
its own price, a property which is satisfied by demand functions that are not too convex. Assumption (55)
is the standard case where revenue is increasing, at a non-decreasing rate, in the other firm’s price. This
property, in particular, is satisfied by linear demand functions. Lastly, (56) states that an increase in the
price of one good increases marginal revenue for the other firm. This is again satisfied in the case of linear
demand.
We make the following assumptions about costs (which are equivalent to (1) and (2) in the Cournot case):
Cˆi∆ =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Cˆi∆∆ =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂ (∆i)
2 ≥ 0,
Cˆipi∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
> 0, Cˆipj∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
< 0 (57)
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0
Cˆipi =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0
Cˆipipi =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
(∂pi)
2 =
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)
2 +
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)
2
(
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
)2
≥ 0
Cˆipipj =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi∂pj
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)
2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
≤ 0. (58)
Note that, assumption (52) implies ∣∣∣Cˆipi∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj ∣∣∣ (59)∣∣∣Cˆipi∆∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆∣∣∣ (60)
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Firm i chooses pi to maximize profits: Π
i(pi, pj ,∆i) = Rˆi(pi, pj)− Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)− φ(∆i) = xi(pi, pj) · pi −
Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)− φ(∆i), where, Rˆi(pi, pj) and Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i) ≡ Ci(xi(pi, pj),∆i) are firm i’s revenue and total
cost:
max
pi
Πi(pi, pj ,∆i) = Rˆi(pi, pj)− Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)− φ(∆i) (61)
The first order condition to this maximization problem gives us the reaction function pi(pj) of firm i. The
FOCs satisfy,
Πii = Rˆ
i
i(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi(p
i, pj ,∆i) = 0. (62)
The second order conditions are the following:
Πiii = Rˆ
i
ii(p
i, pj)− Cˆipipi(p
i, pj ,∆i) < 0 (63)
= pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)
2 + 2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
−
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂ (pi)
2 ≤ 0
We assume that the second order condition is satisfied.14
For later use we need to assume that own effects of output on marginal profits is stronger (bigger in
absolute value) than the cross effect, that is
∣∣Πiii∣∣ > ∣∣Πiij∣∣ . This implies that,
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
1
12Π
2
12 > 0 (64)
The solution to the two equations in (62) gives us prices as a function of R&D levels chosen in the
previous stage: p1 = ψ1(∆1,∆2) and p2 = ψ2(∆1,∆2). The slope of firm i’s reaction function is obtained by
total differentiation of the first order condition (62) with respect to p1 and p2 (keeping ∆1 and ∆2 constant):
dpi
dpj
= −
Rˆiij(p
i, pj)− Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
Rˆiii(p
i, pj)− Cˆi
pipi
(pi, pj ,∆i)
= −
Πiij(p
i, pj ,∆i)
Πiii(p
i, pj ,∆i)
> 0 (65)
Reaction functions are positively sloped (i.e. prices are strategic complements) from assumptions (56), (58)
and (63)). This is a standard result for Bertrand games with differentiated products.
3.2 The Effect of R&D Investment
The effect of R&D investment can be seen by totally differentiating (62):(
Rˆ111(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p1(p
1, p2,∆1)
)
dp1 +
(
Rˆ112(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p2(p
1, p2,∆1)
)
dp2 − Cˆ1p1∆(p
1, p2,∆1)d∆1 = 0(66)(
Rˆ212(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p1p2(p
1, p2,∆2)
)
dp1 +
(
Rˆ222(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2p2(p
1, p2,∆2)
)
dp2 − Cˆ2p2∆(p
1, p2,∆2)d∆2 = 0(67)
Solving the system using Cramer’s rule we get,
dpi =
Πjjj(p
1, p2,∆1)Cˆi
pi∆(p
1, p2,∆i)d∆i −Πiij(p
1, p2,∆1)Cˆj
pj∆(p
1, p2,∆j)d∆j
Πiii(p
1, p2,∆i)Πjjj(p
1, p2,∆j)−Πjij(p
1, p2,∆j)Πiij(p
1, p2,∆i)
. (68)
14Notice that
∂Cˆi(pi,∆i)
∂pi
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂xi(pi,pj)
∂pi
< 0.
∂2Cˆi(pi,∆i)
(∂pi)2
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi,pj)
∂(pi)2
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂(xi)2
(
∂xi(pi,pj)
∂pi
)2
is
positive for convex demands and non-decreasing marginal costs. The second order condition Πiii < 0 is satisfied for linear
demands.
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From the expression above we obtain,
ψii(∆
i,∆j) =
dpi
d∆i
=
ΠjjjCˆ
i
pi∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
< 0 (69)
ψij(∆
i,∆j) =
dpi
d∆j
=
−ΠiijCˆ
j
pj∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
< 0 (70)
where the inequalities come from (56), (57), (58) and (63). The expressions above state that prices are
decreasing both in domestic and foreign R&D. An increase in R&D expenditure reduces the marginal cost
of production shifting the reaction curve of firm i downwards. Given that prices are strategic complements
in (65) this implies that both firm i and firm j charge a lower price.
For later use we need to compute ψjij and ψ
j
ii. Differentiating (70) we obtain
ψiij =
ΠiijCˆ
j
pj∆Cˆ
i
pipi∆Π
j
jj(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
)2 (71)
ψijj =
(
−RˆiijCˆ
j
pj∆∆
)(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
i
ijΠ
j
ij
)
+ΠiijCˆ
j
pj∆Cˆ
j
pjpj∆Π
i
ii(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
i
ijΠ
j
ij
)2 (72)
Note that ψjij is zero for constant marginal costs with respect to output and ψ
j
ii is zero for marginal costs
that are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D.
3.3 Choice of R&D investment
In the R&D stage the profit function of firm i can be written as, πi(∆i,∆j) = Πi(ψi(∆i,∆j), ψ
j(∆i,∆j),∆
i) =
Ri(pi, pj)−Ci(pi, pj ,∆i)−φi(∆i). Using the envelope theorem (i.e. ∂Π
i
∂pi
= 0) we can write firm i′s FOC as,
πii(∆
i,∆j) =
∂πi
∂∆i
=
∂Πi
∂∆i
+
∂Πi
∂pj
∂ψj
∂∆i
= 0 (73)
where ∂Π
i
∂∆i = −Cˆ
i
∆(p
i, pj ,∆i) − φii(∆
i) and ∂Π
i
∂pj
= pi ∂x
i(pi,pj)
∂pj
− Ci
xi
(xi,∆i)∂x
i(pi,pj)
∂pj
> 0 (as long as prices
are greater than marginal cost). Further, ∂ψ
j
∂∆i = ψ
j
i =
−Πj
ij
Cˆi
pi∆
Πi
ii
Πj
jj
−Πj
ij
Πi
ij
< 0. This last inequality gives us the
effect of an increase in R&D by firm i on firm j’s price reaction curve. An increase in R&D by firm i reduces
its marginal cost thereby reducing its price. Prices being strategic complements, this results in a decline in
the price of firm (j). An increase in firm i’s R&D shifts firm j’s price reaction function inwards.
The strategic effect ∂Π
i
∂pj
∂ψj
∂∆i is negative. Firms thus have an incentive to underinvest in R&D in order to
increase the price charged by its rival and therefore increase their own profits. This can be easily seen from
(73) where the optimal choice of R&D leaves ∂Π
i
∂∆i > 0.
Noting that Rˆii(p
i, pj)− Cˆi
pi
(pi, pj ,∆i) = Πii = 0, the first order condition for a Nash equilibrium in the
choice of R&D levels can be rewritten as,
πii(∆
i,∆j) =
[
Rˆij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)
]
ψ
j
i (∆
i,∆j)− Cˆi∆(p
i, pj ,∆i)− φii(∆
i) = 0 (74)
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With the second order condition15
πiii(∆
i,∆j) =
(
Rˆij − Cˆ
i
pj
)
ψ
j
ii + ψ
j
i
(
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆i
−
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
d∆i
)
− Cˆipi∆ψ
i
i − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ
j
i − Cˆ
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0.
(75)
We also assume a condition similar to (64). This refers to the effect of R&D on profits. We again assume
that the own effect of R&D on marginal profits is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect,
that is, πiii < π
i
ij . This implies that,
π111π
2
22 − π
1
12π
2
12 > 0 (76)
where,
πiij =
(
Rˆij − Cˆ
i
pj
)
ψ
j
ij + ψ
j
i
(
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆j
−
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
d∆j
)
− Cˆipi∆ψ
i
j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ
j
j (77)
Here,
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆j = Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)ψij + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψjj < 0 (from (55), (56), (69) and (70)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆j =
Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψij + Cˆ
i
pjpj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψjj . Both the second order condition (75) and the stability condition
(76) impose bounds on φiii (this is discussed later in the determination of the optimal subsidy).
The cross partial derivative πiij can be signed for the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs
(i.e. ψjij = Cˆ
i
pipj
= Cˆi
pjpj
= Rˆijj = 0). The following proposition establishes that, under these circumstances,
R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes even if firms compete in prices.
Proposition 3 R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes for the case of linear demand and constant
marginal costs:
πiij = ψ
j
iψ
i
jRˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ
i
j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ
j
j < 0 (78)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces the marginal profitability of R&D by
firm 1. To see how this occurs, notice that firm 1 sets its R&D, ∆1, to satisfy (74). An infinitesimal increase
in ∆1 has two opposing effects on firm 1’s profits. First, profits increase due to the reducion in total costs
Cˆ1. On the other hand the decrease in p2 (due to increased R&D, ∆1) decreases firm revenues.16 The first
order condition (74) shows this trade off against the increase in the cost of R&D , φ11(∆
1).
15Notice that
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψii + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψji < 0 (by (55), (56), (69) and (70)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
=
Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψii + Cˆ
i
pjpj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψji + Cˆ
i
pj∆
(pi, pj ,∆i). In general,
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
is hard to sign. However, in the case
of linear demand it is equal to Cˆi
pj∆
(pi, pj ,∆i), which is negative. Assuming that marginal costs are constant with respect to
output and linear with respect to R&D (i.e. ψjii = 0), we get π
i
ii(∆
i,∆j) = ψji
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
− Cˆi
pi∆
ψii − 2Cˆ
i
pj∆
ψ
j
i − Cˆ
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii.
This expression can only be negative (for (75) to hold) if 2Cˆi
pj∆
ψ
j
i + Cˆ
i
∆∆+φ
i
ii is big enough. This is equivalent to saying that
as R&D increases, its cost-effectiveness has to decline fast enough, a condition similar to the Cournot case.
16From the envelope theorem we can ignore the effect on firm 1’s price on its profits.
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Consider now an infinitesimal increase in R&D by firm 2. This reduces both p1 and p2. However, the fall
in own price (p2) is greater than the price decline for the rival.17 A bigger price increase for firm 1 means
that it now sells less. Lower output reduces the effectiveness of ∆1 in reducing total costs for firm 1. This
is captured by the last two terms of (78). The first term captures the effect of an increase in ∆2 on the
marginal effect of ∆1 on firm 1’s revenue. The fall in quantity (x1), associated with an increase in ∆2, makes
the revenue loss of an increase in ∆1 less important. This accounts for ψjiψ
i
jRˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj) being positive.
Note that, the (direct) effect over costs dominates the (indirect) effect over revenue (as shown in the
proof of proposition 3). The positive effect of investing in R&D for firm 1 weakens due to an increase in ∆2.
Since the marginal cost of R&D φ11(∆
1) is unaffected by a change in ∆2, an increase in foreign R&D (∆2)
makes own R&D less attractive. Therefore, firm 1 optimally invests less in R&D in response to an increase
in ∆1, implying that πiij < 0.
A corollary of the previous proposition is that the slope of firm i’s R&D reaction function is also negative:
d∆i
d∆j
= −
πiij
πiii
< 0 (79)
where the inequality comes from (75) and (78). Note that, R&D reaction functions are negatively sloped
(i.e. strategic substiututes) both under Cournot and Bertrand competition because the main effect of R&D
comes through total costs. In both cases an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces firm 1’s output thereby
decreasing the capacity of ∆1 to reduce firm 1’s total costs. Under Cournot competition, the effect over
marginal revenue adds to this effect over costs. With Bertrand competition the effect over marginal revenue
dampens (but does not dominate) the effect over costs (as shown in proposition 3).
The next section describes the effect of output subsidies over R&D and price choices, under Bertrand
competition.
3.4 Government Policy
Suppose that government 1 imposes an output subsidy s1. The profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 can now
be written as:
Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1) = Rˆ1(p1, p2)− Cˆ1(p1, p2,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2) (80)
= Π1(p1, p2,∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2) (81)
Π¯2(p1, p2,∆2) = Π2(p1, p2,∆2) = Rˆ2(p1, p2)− Cˆ2(p1, p2,∆2)− φ(∆2). (82)
The net domestic benefit of country 1 is simply the profit of the domestic firm minus the cost of the subsidy,
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1)− s1 · x1(p1, p2) (83)
= Rˆ1(p1, p2)− Cˆ1(p1, p2,∆1)− φ(∆1)
= Π1(p1, p2,∆1).
17This can be easily seen comparing ψii and ψ
i
j on (69) and (70), and recalling that own effects dominate cross effects in the
price stage:
∣
∣
∣Π
j
jj
∣
∣
∣ >
∣
∣
∣Π
j
ij
∣
∣
∣ by (64)
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In the first stage, the problem is similar to the one under free trade: firms maximize Π¯i(p1, p2,∆i, s1) choosing
the price pi. The first order condition to this problem is,
Π¯11 = Rˆ
1
1(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
∂x1
∂p1
= 0 (84)
Π¯22 = Rˆ
2
2(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2(p
1, p2,∆2) = 0 (85)
with the same second order condition as in (63).18 The solution to the two equations in (84) gives us prices
as a function of the R&D levels of both firms (chosen in the previous stage) and output subsidy s1,
pi = ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j , s1) (86)
Differentiation of (84) and (85), (keeping ∆i, ∆j and s1 constant), yields the slope of firm i’s reaction
function. This gives us the same expression as in (65). To see the effect of R&D investment and subsidies
over prices, we differentiate the two first order conditions given in (84) and (85):(
Rˆ111(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p1(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
∂2x1
∂ (p1)
2
)
dp1 +
+
(
Rˆ112(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p2(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
∂2x1
∂p1∂p2
)
dp2 − Cˆ1p1∆(p
1, p2,∆1)d∆1 +
∂x1
∂p1
ds1 = 0
(
Rˆ212(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p1p2(p
1, p2,∆2)
)
dp1 +
+
(
Rˆ222(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2p2(p
1, p2,∆2)
)
dp2 − Cˆ2p2∆(p
1, p2,∆2)d∆2 = 0
The effect of R&D on prices (keeping output subsidy constant) is the same as in the case of free trade (except
for the terms s1 ∂
2x1
∂(p1)2
and s1 ∂
2x1
∂p1∂p2
). Notice, that these terms are equal to zero for linear demands.19 Note
that, the output subsidy is chosen before firms decide on their R&D. This implies that its effect on prices has
to take into account how the subsidy affects the choice of R&D by both firms. The partial effects, keeping
R&D levels (∆1 and ∆2) constant, are:
ψ¯
1
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
< 0 (88)
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
Π212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
< 0. (89)
Notice that we assume that R&D levels are kept constant, while in fact they are influenced by the choice of
output subsidies. The total effect of a change in s1, therefore, has to also take this into account.20 Using
equation (65) we have:
ψ¯
2
s1 = ψ¯
1
s1
dp2
dp1
(90)
18Note that Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as in the case of free trade.
19Therefore, ψ¯
i
∆i(∆
i,∆j , si, sj) = ψii(∆
i,∆j) and ψ¯
j
∆i
(∆i,∆j , si, sj) = ψji (∆
i,∆j) for linear demands [equations (69) and
(70)].
20Expressions for ψ¯
1
s1 and ψ¯
2
s1 (in (88) and (89)) would be relevant if output subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.
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Moreover, from (69) and (70) we have
ψ¯
1
s1 = −
ψ¯
1
∆1
Cˆ1
p1∆
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
< 0 (91)
ψ¯
2
s1 = −
ψ¯
2
∆1
Cˆ2
p2∆
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
< 0 (92)
In order to obtain the effect of imposing an output subsidy (before R&D takes place), we turn now to
the R&D stage.
3.4.1 R&D Investment with output subsidies
Rewriting the profit of the firm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) = Π¯i(ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j , s
1), ψ¯
j
(∆i,∆j , s
1),∆i, s1) (93)
= Rˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)− Cˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
,∆i)− φi(∆i) + s1 · xi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)
We can decompose the effect of a change in R&D (given output subsidies) into its direct and strategic effect.
The strategic effect has the same components as before, hence it is still negative. Therefore, firms underinvest
in R&D for a given output subsidy, . The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D
are,
π¯1∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ2∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1)− Cˆ1∆(p
1, p2,∆1)− φ11(∆
1) = 0
(94)
π¯2∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ21(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
]
ψ1∆2(∆
2,∆1, s1)− Cˆ2∆(p
1, p2,∆2)− φ21(∆
2) = 0. (95)
With the second order condition π¯i∆i∆i < 0.
In order to see the effect of output subsidies over R&D investment, we totally differentiate the two first
order conditions given by (94) and (95). The next proposition describes the effect of an output subsidy on
the equilibrium R&D chosen by firms.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition, an output subsidy by the domestic government increases R&D
of the domestic firm, and reduces R&D of the foreign firm:
d∆1
ds1
> 0 (96)
d∆2
ds1
< 0. (97)
Proof. See appendix
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward once we consider how R&D influences profits. Recall
(from the discussion of proposition 3) that the incentives to invest in R&D decrease if output declines: the
beneficial effects of cost reduction are smaller if output is lower. Consider now an increase in the output
subsidy s1. The output subsidy results in a reduction in the price of both goods. However, p1 declines by a
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Figure 2: Bertrand Competition: Effect of an output subsidy s imposed by government 1.
greater amount than p2. As a result, output of firm 1 increases while output of firm 2 decreases. The output
expansion creates an even greater incentive for firm 1 to invest in R&D (shifts its R&D reaction function
out). The effect on firm 2 is just the contratry: the incentives for firm 2 to invest in R&D decline (firm 2’s
R&D reaction function shifts in) due to the output subsidy, s1.
This is the same type of effect as was observed under Cournot competition. An increase in the output
subsidy increases quantity produced thereby positively affecting the incentives to invest in R&D for the home
firm. In both cases the foreign firm reduces its R&D due to decreased foreign production. As one would
expect, an output subsidy imposed by the domestic government affects domestic R&D more than foreign
R&D. This result, formalized in the next corollary, is used later to determine the sign of the optimal output
subsidy.
Corollary 5 Under Bertrand competition, the effect of an output subsidy over own R&D expenditures is
stronger than over foreign R&D expenditures:∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
∣∣∣∣ (98)
Proof. See appendix
We can conduct a graphical analysis similar to the Cournot case. As with quantity competition, an
increase in output subsidy (s1) shifts the R&D reaction function of firm 1 out and that of firm 2 in (left
half of figure 2) This means that the equilibrium in R&D space moves from B (free trade) to S. For a small
output subsidy, this leaves firm 1 inside its isoprofit contour (π1) that passes through the free trade point
B : just looking at the R&D stage an output subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country. However,
as in the Cournot case, we have to also take into account the effect of the subsidy in the price competition
stage. This is illustrated in the right half of figure 2. As in the case of Cournot competition, an output
subsidy increases domestic and reduces foreign R&D, reducing domestic marginal costs beyond the direct
effect of the subsidy and increasing foreign marginal costs. This means that the domestic price reaction
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function shifts in and the foreign price reaction function shifts out, moving the equilibrium from B to S.
From corollary 5 we know that even if we only take into account the effect of R&D on the price stage, the
reaction function of firm 1 will shift more that the reaction function of firm 2. This leaves point S outside
the isoprofit contour π1 passing through point B in the price space. Therefore an output subsidy reduces
welfare for the home government in the price stage. The net effect on the two stages determines whether an
output subsidy increases or reduces welfare.
Formally, define the net domestic benefit of government 1 as B¯1(s1) = π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1) − s1x1(ψ¯
1
, ψ¯
2
).
Taking the derivative of B¯1(s1) with respect to s1:
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1 − s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
− s1
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(99)
Recall that from the first order condition in the R&D stage, π¯1∆1 = 0, and,
π¯1s1 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1) + x1 (100)
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
+ s1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 + x
1
π¯1∆2 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1) (101)
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
+ s1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
dψ¯
1
ds1
= ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1 (102)
and
dψ¯
2
ds1
= ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 . (103)
The last two expressions capture the total effect of the output subsidy over prices. They take into account
that the subsidy also affects the choice of R&D by both firms in the second stage (and these, in turn, affect
prices). This effect (through R&D) is reflected in the first two terms of the expression.
With these expressions we can rewrite ∂B¯
1
∂s1
:
∂B¯1
∂s1
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
+ s1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
+ s1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 − s
1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
]
(104)
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
)
− s1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
−
(
∂x1
∂p2
)[
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
]]
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
)
− s1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
)]
The first term on the right hand side of (104) shows the effect of the output subsidy over domestic benefit in
the second stage (R&D investment). A domestic output subsidy reduces foreign R&D investment
(
d∆2
ds1 < 0
)
,
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which in turn increases the foreign price p2. The increase in p2 increases domestic output x1 and hence firm
1’s profits. Notice that due to the envelope theorem, the effect of an infinitesimal increase in the subsidy s1
on domestic benefit B¯1 (through domestic R&D) can be ignored.
The second term in (104) captures the effect of an output subsidy over domestic benefit in the third stage
(price competition stage). A domestic output subsidy reduces the foreign price in the price competition stage
(ψ¯
2
s1 < 0). The reduction in the foreign price p
2 reduces domestic output and profits. Again the envelope
theorem allows us to ignore the effect of the output subsidy on domestic benefits through the domestic price
p1.
Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1 equal to zero, an infinitesimal increase in the subsidy increases, or
decreases, domestic benefits if the R&D stage effect
(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
is stronger, or weaker, than the price stage
effect,
(
ψ¯
2
s1
)
.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
)
(105)
The third term in (104) captures the increase, or decrease, in the subsidy bill brought about by an
increase, or decrease, in domestic output. It includes the direct effect of the subsidy in the price competition
stage as well as the R&D stage effect and price stage effect. To obtain the expression for the optimal output
subsidy we need to solve
∂B¯1
∂s1
= 0 (106)
with the second order condition
∂2B¯1
(∂s1)2
< 0. (107)
Solving (106), the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy is obtained:
s1∗ =
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
] (∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1 + ψ¯
2
s1
)
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯1
ds1 +
∂x1
∂p2
(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
)] (108)
Given that the denominator in (108) is positive,21 the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on whether the
effect on the R&D stage or on the price stage dominates in the numerator of (108). As we will see, the sign is
21Note that for linear demands and constant marginal costs:[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
)]
=
∂x1
∂p1
[
ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1 − γ
(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
)]
=
∂x1
∂p1
[(
ψ¯
1
∆1
− γψ¯
2
∆1
) d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1
]
=
∂xi
∂pi
ψ¯
i
∆i
[(
1− γ
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
)
d∆1
ds1
+
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
i
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
]
=
∂xi
∂pi
ψ¯
i
∆i

(1 + γΠiij
Πiii
)
d∆1
ds1
−
Πiij
Πiii
d∆2
ds1
−
∂xi
∂pi
Cˆi
pi∆


=
∂xi
∂pi
ψ¯
i
∆i



1 + γ ∂x
i
∂pj
2∂x
i
∂pi

 d∆1
ds1
−
∂xi
∂pj
2∂x
i
∂pi
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ


=
∂xi
∂pi
ψ¯
i
∆i
[(
1−
γ2
2
)
d∆1
ds1
+
γ
2
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
]
> 0
Effectiveness of R&D and Strategic Trade Policy - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - December 17, 2002 21
ambiguous and depends on the cost of R&D (φ111) relative to the effectiveness of R&D at reducing marginal
costs of production. Define θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi as the effectiveness of R&D. Notice from (69) that
ψ¯
i
∆i is independent of φ
1
11. Therefore,
d∆2
ds1 is the only term in the numerator of (108) that depends on φ
1
11.
The following lemma helps to understand the role of the cost of R&D on the elasticity of R&D to output
subsidies.
Lemma 6 The influence of output subsidies over R&D decreases as the marginal cost of R&D increases.
Specifically,
∂
∣
∣
∣
d∆1
ds1
∣
∣
∣
∂φ111
< 0 (109)
∂
∣
∣
∣
d∆2
ds1
∣
∣
∣
∂φ111
< 0. (110)
Proof. See Appendix
An increase in φ111 makes R&D investment more convex. As a result, R&D is less elastic to an output
subsidy, and therefore the R&D stage effect of an output subsidy in (108) is weaker. Whenever the R&D
stage effect is weak, the optimal output subsidy is influenced more by the price stage effect and should be
optimally set below zero (an output tax).
The domestic government only takes into account the effect of an output subsidy over price competition
when the effect of an output subsidy over foreign R&D is smaller (φ111 becomes higher). Contrarily, the
government only takes into account the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage when φ111 is small
enough. The following proposition formalizes this result, showing that we could have an output subsidy or
a tax depending on the convexity of the cost of investment in R&D, i.e. φi11.
22
Proposition 7 Under Bertrand competition, the optimal output subsidy s1∗ can be positive or negative,
depending on the convexity of the cost of R&D (φi11). The optimal output subsidy is positive (an output
subsidy) when the cost of additional investment in R&D is sufficiently low (low φi11), and negative (an
output tax) when φi11 is sufficiently high. Specifically,
∃φ¯ <∞ such that if φi11 > φ¯ then s
1∗ < 0
∃φ > θπ¯1∆1s1 − π
i
∆i∆j such that if φ
i
11 < φ then s
1∗ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix
As φ increases, the cost of investng in R&D becomes more convex. A steeper R&D cost function makes
R&D less elastic with respect to an output subsidy. This reduces the effect of the subsidy over the foreign
where θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
measures the effectiveness of R&D at reducing marginal costs of production and γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
is a measure of the degree of product differentiation. The inequality comes from
∣∣∣ d∆1
ds1
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣ d∆2
ds1
∣∣∣ (Corollary 5) and
(
1− γ
2
2
)
> γ
2
for γ between zero and one.
22Notice, however, that φi11 is bounded below by the stability condition (76) and therefore cannot take values below θπ¯
1
∆1s1
−
πi∆i∆j
. See the proof of lemma 6.
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firm’s R&D reaction function, leaving the effect over the foreign firm price reaction function unaffected. This
implies that the domestic government has an incentive to reduce the output subsidy, or even tax output, as
in the standard Bertrand game without R&D investment.
The following section performs a numerical exercise to highlight the results of price and quantity com-
petition.
4 A Numerical Example
In this example,23 we consider linear demands and constant marginal costs with respect to output. In
particular, assume that the inverse demand for good i is given by:
pi = a− b(xi + γxj). (111)
With 0 < γ < 1. Cost functions are linear in output,
C(xi,∆i) =
(
c− θ∆i
)
xi (112)
and the monetary cost of ∆i units of R&D is quadratic:
φ(∆i) = φ
(
∆i
)2
2
. (113)
The optimal output subsidy is always positive under Cournot competition, as both the R&D stage effect
(q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1 ) and the price stage effect (q¯
2
s1) have the same sign (see proposition 2). R&D becomes more elastic
with respect to the output subsidy as the cost of R&D becomes flatter (i.e. φi11 falls). In this case the
government has greater incentives to subsidize output thereby reducing foreign R&D. Figure 3 shows the
optimal subsidy as a function of the cost-effectiveness of R&D (defined as η = θ
2
φb
). The optimal subsidy is
increasing in η.
The case of Bertrand competition is a bit more complicated. We have to satisfy (107), the second order
condition of the government maximization problem. It turns out that the optimal subsidy also depends
on the cost—effectiveness of R&D (η). Figure 4 shows the optimal output subsidy, which is increasing in η
(decreasing in φi11). Note that as the R&D effect becomes stronger (η increases) the government reverses its
policy from an output tax to an output subsidy.24 Note also that, interestingly, there is a set of parameter
values for which free trade (s1∗ = 0) is an equilibrium in the Bertrand case, even in the presence of imperfect
competition.
Tables 1 and 2 present numerical results for γ = 0.3 and two different values of η (0.3 and 0.7). Notice that
all relevant quantities are positive and that the second order condition for the government’s maximization
problem is satisfied. Table 2 shows that, depending on the cost-effectiveness of R&D (η), there could be a
policy reversal under Bertrand competition.25
23The mathematica code used to generate the numerical results is available from the authors upon request.
24For the Bertrand example in this section, (figure 4), the stability condition (76) translates into
η <
(
1− γ2
)
(4− γ2)2
2 (2− γ2) (2 + γ − γ2)
For the value in the numerical example (γ = 0.5), we require η < 1.33929 to satisfy that condition.
25The numerical simulations presented in section 3 of Neary and Leahy (2000) assume, for the Cournot case, a set of
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Figure 3: Cournot: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-effectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
h
-0.025
0.025
0.05
0.075
0.1
s
1*
Figure 4: Bertrand: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-effectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
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Cournot Competition: numerical simulation
Product differentiation γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-effectiveness of R&D η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price firm 1 p1 0.2765a+ 0.7235c 0.0689a+ 0.9311c
Price firm 2 p2 0.3035a+ 0.6965c 0.1349a+ 0.8651c
Output firm 1 x1 0.5004
(
a−c
b
)
0.6648
(
a−c
b
)
Output firm 2 x2 0.4463
(
a−c
b
)
0.5328
(
a−c
b
)
R&D firm 1 ∆1 0.1601
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4964
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D firm 2 ∆2 0.1428
(
a−c
θ
)
0.3977
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit profit firm 1 m1 = p1 − c+ s1 0.3403 (a− c) 0.1684 (a− c)
Unit profit firm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.3035 (a− c) 0.1349 (a− c)
Total profits firm 1 π1 0.2076 (a−c)
2
b
0.2659 (a−c)
2
b
Total profits firm 2 π2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 1 B1 0.1757 (a−c)
2
b
0.1998 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 2 B2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal output subsidy s1∗ 0.0638 (a− c) 0.0995 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−
0.5987
b
−
0.8141
b
Table 1: Numerical simulation under Cournot Competition in the third stage
Bertrand Competition: numerical simulations
Product differentiation γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-effectiveness of R&D η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price firm 1 p1 0.2575a+ 0.7425c 0.0483a+ 0.9517c
Price firm 2 p2 0.2422a+ 0.7578c 0.0598a+ 0.9401c
Output firm 1 x1 0.4848
(
a−c
b
)
0.6422
(
a−c
b
)
Output firm 2 x2 0.5154
(
a−c
b
)
0.6191
(
a−c
b
)
R&D firm 1 ∆1 0.1357
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4196
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D firm 2 ∆2 0.1443
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4044
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit profit firm 1 m1 = p1 − c+ s1 0.2278 (a− c) 0.0621 (a− c)
Unit profit firm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.2422 (a− c) 0.0598 (a− c)
Total profits firm 1 π1 0.1455 (a−c)
2
b
0.1836 (a−c)
2
b
Total profits firm 2 π2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 1 B1 0.1599 (a−c)
2
b
0.1747 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 2 B2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal output subsidy s1∗ −0.0297 (a− c) 0.0138 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−
0.8055
b
−
1.1226
b
Table 2: Numerical simulation under Bertrand Competition in the third stage
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5 Conclusions
This paper shows that for sufficiently cost effective R&D the trade policy reversal in Eaton and Grossman
(1986) is not observed. Our result suggests that output subsidies are more robust than otherwise implied by
the literature on strategic trade. If exporting industries make long run investments before competing in the
market then governments have a case for using output subsidies even if they are uncertain about the mode
of competition in the market.
We show that a necessary condition for output subsidies to be robust is that R&D be sufficiently cost
effective. If the cost of R&D is too convex then R&D expenditures will be relatively inelastic to the export
subsidy. In this case, the effect of an export subsidy on R&D will be negligible and will thus be arbitrarily
close to the case when there is no R&D investment (Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman
(1986)). If R&D costs are not too convex then R&D is responsive to an output subsidy. In this case, the effect
of the output subsidy on the R&D stage reinforces the effect of the output subsidy on the market competition
stage under Cournot competition, and dominates it under Bertrand competition. Thus, regardless of the
mode of competition, the optimal policy is an output subsidy if R&D is sufficiently cost-effective.
Our condition on the curvature of the cost of R&D is reminiscent of Maggi (1996). In his model, firms
invest in capacity and then compete in prices in the product market. Maggi shows that going from Cournot
to Bertrand competition the optimal policy changes from an output subsidy to a tax. The key parameter
is his model is the convexity of the cost function. A more convex cost function (i.e. steeper marginal cost)
results in firm behavior closer to price competition. The optimal trade policy in this case is an output tax.
Contrarily, a flatter marginal cost implies that the optimal policy is an output subsidy. In contrast to Maggi
(1996), in our model marginal costs are constant. Under Bertrand competition, whether the optimal policy
is an output subsidy or a tax, depends on the convexity of the cost of R&D . Under Cournot competition,
the optimal trade policy is always an output subsidy.
parameters, which with our notation, imply b = γ = θ = a − c = 1 and η = 1
φ
= 0.2. For that set of parameters we obtain
an optimal subsidy s1∗ = 0.3089, which roughly corresponds to what they refer to as the second—best optimal output subsidy.
This is represented by the intersection of the flatter line with the vertical axis in their figure 3.
For the Bertrand simulation, they use a set of parameters b = θ = a− c = 1 and η = 1
φ
= 0.4, with inverse demands
xi = a− b(pi − pj)
which means that cross price effects are as strong as own price effects. Therefore we cannot compare directly with their
results. They find that the optimal output subsidy is negative (point C in their figure 4). If we set γ = 0.5 with their other
parameters, in our simulation we obtain a negative output subsidy (i.e. a tax) equal to s1∗ = −0.0224. We only need to have a
cost—effectiveness of R&D beyond 0.6 to obtain a positive output subsidy, as shown in figure 4.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate totally the two first order conditions given by (42). These equations can be rewritten in a more
compact way as:
π¯1∆1∆1d∆
1 + π¯1∆1∆2d∆
2 + π¯1∆1s1ds
1 = 0 (114)
π¯2∆1∆2d∆
1 + π¯2∆2∆2d∆
2 + π¯2∆2s1ds
1 = 0 (115)
and using Cramer’s rule:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j π¯
i
∆is1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j − π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j
(116)
In order to obtain the value of the expressions in (116) we first need to sign the total effect of subsidies
over marginal revenues (including the effect over the last stage (quantity competition). We therefore have
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R112(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
1
22(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 < 0 (117)
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R211(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
2
12(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 > 0 (118)
by (6), (7), (37) and (38). Using these signs we can now turn to the elements in (116)
π¯i∆i∆i = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆i + q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆i − C
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0 (119)
π¯i∆i∆j = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆j + q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆j
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆j < 0 (120)
π¯1∆1s1 = R
1
2q¯
2
∆1s1 + q¯
2
∆1
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
− C1x∆q¯
1
s1 > 0 (121)
π¯2∆2s1 = R
2
1q¯
1
∆2s1 + q¯
1
∆2
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
− C2x∆q¯
2
s1 < 0 (122)
where the first inequality is the second order condition of the maximization in the R&D stage, the second
inequality repeats (28), and the last two inequalities are derived from (117), (118), (37), (38), (20) and noting
that for linear demand and constant marginal costs, q¯i∆j is independent of s
1. Therefore
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯2∆2∆2 π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆2s1
π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2∆2 − π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆1∆2
> 0 (123)
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
2
∆2∆1 π¯
1
∆1s1
π¯2∆2∆2 π¯
1
∆1∆1 − π¯
2
∆2∆1 π¯
1
∆2∆1
< 0 (124)
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B Proof of Proposition 3.
Note that,
πiij = ψ
j
iψ
i
jRˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ
i
j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ
j
j
=
−ΠjijCˆ
i
pi∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
−ΠiijCˆ
j
pj∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
Rˆiij − Cˆ
i
pi∆
−ΠiijCˆ
j
pj∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
− Cˆipj∆
ΠiiiCˆ
j
pj∆
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
=
ΠjijCˆ
i
pi∆Π
i
ijCˆ
j
pj∆Rˆ
i
ij + Cˆ
i
pi∆Π
i
ijCˆ
j
pj∆
(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
)
− Cˆi
pj∆Π
i
iiCˆ
j
pj∆
(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
)
(
ΠiiiΠ
j
jj −Π
j
ijΠ
i
ij
)2 (125)
Recall that, for linear demands, Πiij = Rˆ
i
ij . Notice also that in the case of linear demands, Π
i is quadratic
and all second derivatives of Πi(p1, p2) are thus constant. Therefore, Πiii = Π
j
jj and Π
j
ij = Π
i
ij . If we also
have constant marginal costs, all second derivatives of Cˆi(p1, p2,∆i) are constant. Therefore Cˆi
pi∆ = Cˆ
j
pj∆.
Remember also that
∣∣Πiii∣∣ > ∣∣Πiij∣∣, ∣∣∣Cˆipi∆∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∂xi∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂xi∂pj ∣∣∣ . This implies that
πiij =
(
Πiij
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
+
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
Πiij
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiij
)3
− Cˆi
pj∆
(
Πiii
)3
Cˆi
pi∆ + Cˆ
i
pj∆Π
i
iiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Πiij
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
=
(
Cˆipi∆
)2
Πiij
(
Πiii
)2
− Cˆi
pj∆
(
Πiii
)3
Cˆi
pi∆ + Cˆ
i
pj∆Π
i
iiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Πiij
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

Πiij
Πiii
−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)2
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
−
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
+
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
(
1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)2
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ −
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (126)
since γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
is between zero and one and Πiii < 0. Notice that γ measures the degree of product
differentiation and is bounded between 0 (independent goods) and 1 (perfect substitutes).
C Proof of Proposition 4
For the first part of the proof, we will follow similar steps as the proof of proposition 1. We start by
differentiating totally the two first order conditions given by (94) and (95).
π¯1∆1∆1d∆
1 + π¯1∆1∆2d∆
2 + π¯1∆1s1ds
1 = 0 (127)
π¯2∆2∆2d∆
2 + π¯2∆1∆2d∆
1 + π¯2∆2s1ds
1 = 0 (128)
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and using Cramer’s rule:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j π¯
i
∆is1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j − π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j
(129)
To obtain the value of expressions in (116) we need to obtain the total effect of subsidies over marginal
revenues (including the effect on the last (price competition) stage). We have
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆i + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆i < 0 (130)
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆j
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆j + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (131)
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
ds1
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
s1 + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
s1 < 0 (132)
where the inequalities are obtained from (55), (56), (69), (70), (88) and (89).
Turn next to the total effect of R&D over marginal costs:
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
d∆i
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆i + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆i + Cˆ
i
pj∆(p
i, pj ,∆i) < 0 (133)
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
d∆j
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆j + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆j = 0 (134)
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
ds1
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
s1 + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
s1 = 0 (135)
where the inequalities are derived from (57), (58), (69), (70), (88) and (89). We also assume linear demand
and constant marginal cost with respect to output (so that Cˆipjpj = Cˆ
i
pipj
= 0). Finally, notice that for linear
demands, the slope of the demand function is not influenced by R&D. Formally:
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j
=
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)
2 ψ¯
i
∆j +
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
ψ¯
j
∆j = 0 (136)
Using these inequalities we can now turn to the elements of (129). As in the case of free trade (see
proof of proposition 3), we will use the fact that, for linear demands, Πiij = Rˆ
i
ij and both are quadratic
with constant second derivatives with respect to prices. Therefore, Πiii = Π
j
jj and Π
j
ij = Π
i
ij . If we also
have constant marginal costs, all second derivatives of Cˆi(p1, p2,∆i) are constant. Therefore Cˆi
pi∆ = Cˆ
j
pj∆.
For linear demand and constant marginal costs we have ψ¯
i
∆j∆j = ψ¯
i
∆i∆j =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆j =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
ds1 =
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j = Cˆ
i
∆∆ = 0. Remember also that
∣∣Πiii∣∣ > ∣∣Πiij∣∣, ∣∣∣Cˆipi∆∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∂xi∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂xi∂pj ∣∣∣ . All these imply
that
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where γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
measures the degree of product differentiation as in the proof of proposition 3.
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π¯2∆2∆1 =
(
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2
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)
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< 0 (142)
The second order condition (75) means that π¯i∆i∆i < 0, whereas the stability condition (76) implies that(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
>
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
. All these mean:
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
2
∆2s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 > 0 (143)
and
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
1
∆1s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (144)
Which is the statement of the proposition.
From (137), (139), (141) and (142) we can also derive the following relationships, to be used later:
π¯1∆1s1
(
−
Cˆi
pi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
− φ111 = θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − φ
1
11 = π¯
i
∆i∆i (145)
π¯2∆2s1
(
−
Cˆi
pi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
= θπ¯2∆2s1 = π¯
i
∆i∆j (146)
π¯1∆1s1
π¯i∆i∆j
=
1
θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] (147)
π¯2∆2s1θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] − φ111 = π¯i∆i∆i (148)
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D Proof of Corollary 5
Note, first, that from (141) and (142),
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣ for γ between 0 and 1. Also, from (143) and (144):
∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
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−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
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=
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2
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π¯i∆i∆i + π¯
i
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> 0 (149)
where the inequality comes from the denominator being negative ((75) and proposition 3), π¯1∆1s1 > 0 by
(141) and
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣.
E Proof of Lemma 6
Before proving the statement of the lemma, we need to derive the restrictions on φi11 implied by the second
order condition (75) and the stability condition (76).
From the definition of π¯i∆i∆i in (137), in order to satisfy the second order condition π¯
i
∆i∆i < 0 we need
to ensure
φi11 >
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
γ2 −
1
4
γ4 − 1
]
= θπ¯1∆1s1 > 0 (150)
where θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi measures how fast marginal costs are reduced per unit of R&D.
On the other hand, the stability condition in (76) translates into:
π¯i∆i∆i
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=
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3
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> 1 (151)
using (147):
φi11 + π
i
∆i∆j > π
i
∆i∆j
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
]
φi11 > θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − π
i
∆i∆j > 0 (152)
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Since πi∆i∆j < 0, then only (152) is binding..
From the definition of d∆1ds1 and
d∆2
ds1 (143), (144) and the identities (148), (146), (145) and (147) we have
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Notice that all the terms in the expressions above do not depend on φ111 except, of course φ
1
11. Taking the
derivative with respect to φ111
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> 0 (156)
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where the inequalities are derived using (152). Since d∆
1
ds1 > 0 and
d∆2
ds1 < 0, the statement of the proposition
follows
F Proof of Proposition 7
Rewrite the optimal subsidy as
s1∗ = m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1 + ψ¯
2
s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯1
ds1 +
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯2
ds1
(157)
where m1 = p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1 > 0 is the gross benefit per unit sold, including the output subsidy. Of course,
m1 has to be positive (otherwise firm 1 would have negative profits).
Turn now to the sign of the denominator in (157). It is positive since
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dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
=
∂x1
∂p1
(
ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1 +
(
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
)(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
+
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
1
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
− γ
(
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
2
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
−
Πiij
Πiii
d∆2
ds1
−
∂xi
∂pi
Cˆi
pi∆
− γ
(
−
Πiij
Πiii
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
−
ψ¯
1
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
Πiij
Πiii
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
−
∂xi
∂pj
2∂x
i
∂pi
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
− γ
(
−
∂xi
∂pj
2∂x
i
∂pi
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
γ
2θ
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
+
γ
2
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
− γ
(
γ
2
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
γ
2θ
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
(
1−
γ2
2
)
−
γ
2
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
(
1−
γ2
2
))
> 0 (158)
where the inequality comes from d∆
1
ds1 > 0 >
d∆2
ds1 (Proposition 4) and
(
1− γ
2
2
)
> γ2 > 0 for γ between zero
and one.
Therefore the sign of s1∗ is the same as the sign of ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1 + ψ¯
2
s1 . Recall that
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 = ψ¯
2
∆2
(
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2
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2
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(
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(
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γ
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(159)
Since ψ¯
i
∆i is independent of φ
i
11, then a change in φ
i
11 only affects
d∆2
ds1 (i.e. the R&D stage effect). From
lemma 6,
∂ d∆
2
ds1
∂φ1
11
> 0 and so ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1 +
γ
2θ
)
in decreasing on φi11. Left to show is that ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1 +
γ
2θ
)
can
be positive or negative for permissible values of φi11.
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From (154) we have
d∆2
ds1
=
1
θ
φ111π¯
i
∆i∆j(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (160)
And so limφ1
11
↗∞ ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1 +
γ
2θ
)
= ψ¯
i
∆i
γ
2θ < 0 and limφ1
11
↘
(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
−πi
∆i∆j
) ψ¯i∆i
(
d∆2
ds1 +
γ
2θ
)
= +∞. By
continuity, the claim of the proposition follows.
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